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Hong Kong 1997: Practical Aspects
Benjamin P. Fishburne,II*
Introduction
The purpose of this Article is to discuss the practical aspects of dealing
with Hong Kong in the post-1997 period. By definition, this subject is
necessarily speculative. It is, first of all, a long time until 1997. In addition, life in Hong Kong will be affected in large measure by events on the
world stage over which Hong Kong will have little or no control. Finally, a great deal will depend upon the implementation of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
It has to be recognized that this Article could be completely, disastrously and totally wrong. The Article is, after all, trying to predict essentially unpredictable events almost a decade in the future. Having
acknowledged this fact, it is the author's belief that events will turn out
more or less as predicted in this Article. Part of the reason for this belief
is that the Joint Declaration is an excellent framework for the events
which will take place in Hong Kong in 1997. There are most assuredly
going to be rough spots along the way, as concepts, such as "directly
elected," become realities. There will also be serious points of contention
when the draft Basic Law is publicized for the first time. Such difficulties
are to be anticipated in virtually any complex situation where the parties
move from the stage of agreement in principle to practical implementation. The author believes that the governments of Great Britain and the
People's Republic of China and the people of Hong Kong will in the end
arrive at workable, practical solutions.
It is the author's basic belief that dealing with Hong Kong after
1997 will be very much like dealing with Hong Kong today. This conclusion is in significant part based on non-political factors. It does assume a relatively stable and peaceful political sphere, but things do not
have to be perfect in the political arena. A number of the factors which
contribute to Hong Kong's prosperity today will continue after 1997.
* Resident Partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Hong Kong; Associate Counsel, National
Council for U.S.-China Trade; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1968; B.A., University of Notre Dame,
1965. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those
of the National Council for U.S.-China Trade.
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Transportation
One of the keys to Hong Kong's success which cannot be changed is
its location. After 1997, Hong Kong will still have one of the busiest,
strategically located and most productive harbors in the world. Hong
Kong's existing infrastructure should be enough to carry it into the next
century as a shipping center. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that
Hong Kong will not continue to invest and improve its transportation
related facilities. Thus goods from all over the world, and particularly
goods destined to and from China, will continue to transit Hong Kong as
is the present practice.
In addition, Hong Kong will continue to be a vital air link and a
major hub of Southeast Asian air traffic. Even if Hong Kong's air terminal facilities do not improve markedly in the coming nine years, and
there is reason to assume that they will improve and also to assume that a
second airport may be built in the coming decade either in Hong Kong or
just across the border in Guangdong Province, air services to Hong Kong
are certainly not going to regress absent the most startling political
reverses.
Hong Kong also has important, modem rail links between itself and
southern China. Particularly with respect to the flow of goods to Hong
Kong from China, these facilities are in place, are likely to improve, and
should help to make dealing with Hong Kong in 1997 much like it is
today.
Infrastructure
Hong Kong serves as a business and financial center in part because
of its strong existing physical infrastructure. The office buildings are
built and more are being built. Acceptable expatriate housing is in place.
Hong Kong has a communications network that may be second to none
in the world. World class hotels are available for business travellers.
State of the art communications, data processing and related equipment
and services from all over the world are all available in Hong Kong. This
infrastructure is not going anywhere in 1997.
Services
A strong services sector exists in Hong Kong today. Lawyers, both
from Hong Kong and from other jurisdictions, accountants, consultants,
commercial banks, merchant banks, investment advisors, and the brokerage community are all in Hong Kong. Thus, the support services that go
into making a business and financial center are all present. It is true that,
if things go badly enough, some key elements of this services sector could
leave Hong Kong or de-emphasize Hong Kong to Hong Kong's considerable detriment. Nevertheless, while almost anything can be disman-
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tled, having these services in place in 1997, as they surely will be, will go
a long way to preserving the status quo in the post-1997 era. Moreover,
many of these service organizations are international firms. Thus, should
China decide for some reason that it wishes to tamper with the services
sector after 1997, it will find that it is dealing not only with the people of
Hong Kong, and the British, but also with the Americans, the Japanese,
the French, the Germans, the Dutch, the Indians, the Thais, the Swiss
and a large number of other nationalities which have business presences
in Hong Kong. Indeed a step which Hong Kong can take in the coming
years, that will further strengthen its position, is to encourage this process of internationalization of the services sector. In addition, many
members of this international services industry have strong ties to China.
For example, many international companies with successful projects in
China have their headquarters for these projects in Hong Kong. China is
unlikely to wish to upset this group.
The People
One of Hong Kong's great attributes is its hardworking, dedicated,
innovative and ambitious population. The extent to which this population will remain in Hong Kong after 1997 will be discussed below; however, to the extent that it does, these are the people who have made Hong
Kong what it is today.
Regulation
Another of Hong Kong's great strengths is the combination of the
government's laissez-faire attitude toward business and the fact that almost all of Hong Kong business is concentrated in the private sector.
These two factors will make it more difficult for a new sovereign to affect
business. First, the philosophy of the Hong Kong government in regulating business has been to provide the minimum supervision and restriction
consistent with responsible action. For its part, the private sector has
been most vocal in resisting attempts at further government control. Accordingly, a new sovereign will find few mechanisms existing by which it
can interfere with day-to-day business operations. Thus, although there
is no reason to assume that it will want to, China would initially have to
formulate and pass through the Hong Kong legislature a whole series of
laws and regulations concerning business if it were to wish to take Hong
Kong business more firmly in hand after 1997. In the author's view, this
is unlikely to take place given the vocal and effective opposition which
the Hong Kong business community can generate even for benign legislation. In addition, one of the great criticisms of the Chinese business system is its excessive bureaucracy. Even the Chinese themselves recognize
this fact. Their system, however, starts from the proposition that busi-
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ness is government planned, government owned and government controlled. Exactly the opposite exists in Hong Kong. It will, therefore, be
difficult for China to impose its approach on Hong Kong's private sector.
A system of private business does not become government controlled
without the most significant upheavals.
Economic Cooperation
Even though it has become almost a clich6, it is necessary to point
out that China has a great deal to lose and nothing to gain by attempting
to interfere with Hong Kong's independent business system and economy. Indeed, at the present time, China has expanded to a considerable
extent the number of Chinese government controlled organizations
which are doing business in Hong Kong. These organizations appear to
have come to Hong Kong to participate in its economic prosperity and to
learn new ways of doing business. Several Chinese organizations, most
notably the Bank of China, China International Trust & Investment Corporation and China Resources Corporation are all major players on the
Hong Kong scene and have contributed significantly to Hong Kong's
prosperity. Conversely, these powerful Chinese organizations have major investments in Hong Kong and have, therefore, much to lose by any
major attempt at regulating or interfering with business in Hong Kong.
Similarly, the last few years have seen a remarkable increase in the
utilization of China's low cost manufacturing force by Hong Kong enterprises. The establishment by China in late 1980 of Special Economic
Zones, which are located in close proximity to Hong Kong, is one reason
for this increased economic cooperation between Hong Kong and China.
Another reason is purely economic; as the Hong Kong work force has
become more highly paid, Hong Kong has lost some of its ability to be a
low cost manufacturer. The use of Chinese labor has been an obvious
solution. In the last few years, the number of new operations that involve high cost or high technology components produced in Hong Kong
and then assembled in China has been quite startling. More and more
businesses operating in Hong Kong, including the Hong Kong operations of multinational corporations, have a Guangdong Province or Special Economic Zone element. All of this activity has created a certain
community interest between Hong Kong and, at least, southern China,
which should serve as a stabilizing element in the post-1997 era.
Government Efficiency
There are, however, several notes of caution. First, one of the keys
to Hong Kong's success has been the efficiency and integrity of the Hong
Kong government. Even governments which do not attempt to regulate
business excessively must register corporations, collect taxes, issue
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licenses, grant visas, regulate securities trading and the like. In Hong
Kong, as elsewhere, the British have been efficient and honest administrators. Although the Joint Declaration takes into account the possibility that, after 1997, the Hong Kong government can continue to utilize
the services of its expatriate bureaucrats, there is certainly a significant
risk that the average British civil servant may not wish to make his or her
services available to a different sovereign.
In addition, the Hong Kong government for some years has been
embarked upon a process of "localization" in the civil service. It is certainly sensible for any government to seek to develop qualified civil servants from among local inhabitants. This localization program has had
some successes, and a number of senior Hong Kong officials, including
its new Chief Justice, are all of Chinese origin. On the other hand, expatriate civil servants feel somewhat disadvantaged by this program. First,
they feel that, no matter how long they have actually been in Hong
Kong, and some expatriate civil servants have been in Hong Kong for
fifteen and twenty years, their positions are only temporary. Moreover,
expatriates feel that they will eventually lose out to a qualified but less
experienced local resident. Thus, the localization policy of the Hong
Kong government may in itself result in some loss of governmental efficiency and inability to retain valued expatriate staff. If you add to this
probelm the change in sovereignty, the situation is likely to get worse
rather than better.
Although China is noted for many positive accomplishments, administrative efficiency is generally not high on the list. Thus, one area
worthy of close observation will be the efficiency with which the Hong
Kong government operates after 1997. As noted above, the ability of the
Hong Kong government, no matter who is the sovereign, to have direct
impact on business in Hong Kong is somewhat limited. In addition, localization is a sound policy. It is generally accepted that a fully qualified
local administrator is certainly the equal of and is probably better than
his expatriate peer. Thus, over the long term, the bureaucratic aspects of
the change in sovereignty should work themselves out.
Emigration
The other problem upon which to focus in the approaching years
and after 1997 is the question of emigration by Hong Kong residents.
The people of Hong Kong are one of its greatest strengths. If they "vote
with their feet" now as well as after 1997, Hong Kong will have a serious
problem. Hong Kong's "brain drain" is perhaps the most frequent current topic in conversation among businessmen. People are leaving Hong
Kong or making arrangements to leave Hong Kong in record numbers.
Worse, the people with the means to leave Hong Kong come from the
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top and the middle of the business community. A likely candidate for
emigration is the middle manager, the stock broker, the accountant, the
lawyer, the executive secretary, or the banker with client responsibilities.
These are the people that make the businesses operate; they are also the
most likely to have a good command of English.
There is no question that it makes sense for Hong Kong's middle
class to have what amounts to a political insurance policy. No matter
how confident they are about China's behavior after 1997, most feel that
it is only prudent and responsible for them to obtain a foreign passport
giving them the right to live elsewhere, most frequently Canada, Australia or the United States, if things do not go as they wish after 1997. It is
often a question of hoping for the best and preparing for the worst.
There is a great deal of disagreement in the local community and in
the press as to whether these Hong Kong people seeking the right to live
elsewhere really intend to remain in Hong Kong. A number of people
argue that, once Hong Kong people have established their right to live
elsewhere and satisfy the necessary residence requirements, they will return to Hong Kong with the intention of staying. Others argue that,
when one packs up and moves his family, to Canada for example, enrolls
his children in school and establishes his family, normal human nature
will make it very difficult to uproot the family and return to Hong Kong
or, worse, to leave the family overseas with the breadwinner conducting
his business in Hong Kong as he did in the past.
There is no question that there will be people who decide to leave
Hong Kong. It must be borne in mind that a considerable portion of
Hong Kong's population came to Hong Kong to escape communism after 1949. The changes in China between 1949 and the present may not
be enough to dissuade some people from leaving, although the changes in
China between the launching of its "open door policy" in 1978 and today
have been truly remarkable in the positive sense. Hong Kong can survive
a reasonable amount of emigration. It is said that Hong Kong people
always viewed Hong Kong as a stopping off place and there have always
been departures and returns. On the other hand, westerners must also
bear in mind the strong ties that Chinese people have to their families
and to their country. Thus, both with respect to Hong Kong and to
China, people that leave often come back.
Nevertheless, there is considerable risk with respect to emigration.
Businesses are going to have to cope with some loss of staff. Recruiting,
training, use of third country nationals, use of additional expatriates and
recruiting and training of promising candidates from China, all can play
a role in filling the gaps in Hong Kong. It is the author's view that Hong
Kong will be able to cope with the departures. It is also the author's
view that responsible behavior by China with respect to Hong Kong, behavior that is clearly in China's self-interest, will demonstrate to the
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Hong Kong population that it has nothing to fear. Post-1997 events,
more than anything else, will control the loss of talented Hong Kong
people and retrieve some who have left.
Economic Interference
An additional area of potential difficulty is what the Chinese call
"the red-eye disease." One of the problems with the "one country, two
systems" approach is that the participants in one of the systems will be
significantly better off in material terms than those operating under the
other system. It would be a denial of human nature to suggest that this
does not pose a potential for difficulty. These difficulties could move
from the individual to the organizational level. Chinese businesses in
large numbers may push for a part of Hong Kong's success, or at least
push to take part in Hong Kong's economy. Many of these organizations
will not be China's experienced, elite economic entities. Rather, they will
be "ordinary" Chinese entities. Some may be inexperienced and greedy.
The Chinese are tough negotiators. These new organizations may demand special, concessionary terms from Hong Kong businessmen arguing that "China is still a poor developing country." These organizations
could also use their connections within the Chinese bureaucracy to be
"placed" in valuable relationships in Hong Kong. Activities of this type
on a large scale will not have immediate negative impact. Nevertheless,
over time the impact will be devastating. Hong Kong's success is attributable to subjecting ventures to the trials of the market place. Hong Kong
may be economic Darwinism in its highest form. Tampering with this
approach will gradually squeeze the soul from Hong Kong's vibrant business community. It is very much in the interest of the Chinese not to let
this happen. Nevertheless, among the problems which could occur, this
economic encroachment is the most insidious and potentially the most
damaging.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be stated again that some of the ingredients
of Hong Kong's success are virtually immune from political interference.
Hong Kong's location and its considerable infrastructure fall into this
category. In addition, Hong Kong's legal structure does not lend itself
very well to governmental interference with business. While the structure, as any legal structure, can be changed, this change will come only
with great difficulty, given the likely resistance of Hong Kong's post1997 legislature and the business community to tampering with Hong
Kong's recipe for success. In addition, Hong Kong has become a very
international city, with businesses from a number of countries having
material financial stakes in Hong Kong's future. These countries, to va-
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rying degrees, will all seek to preserve Hong Kong. At the present time,
Chinese institutions also appear to have an economic stake in Hong
Kong's future prosperity. Some of these organizations are quite powerful
and successful and are likely to make themselves heard at the top levels
of the Chinese government. The significant and growing number of joint
Hong Kong-Chinese business operations will also be a force for stability.
While there is some concern about the departure of large numbers of
Hong Kong's best educated and most talented people, these departures
have to date been at reasonable levels, and there is considerable hope in
the Hong Kong community that not all these departures are permanent.
In addition, there are means available to businesses of coping with staff
shortages. One of these means which should not be overlooked is the
vast human resources available for training just across Hong Kong's border in China. Finally, it is in China's self-interest to keep Hong Kong
viable and prosperous. China has and should continue to receive major
economic benefit from Hong Kong. China has and will learn from Hong
Kong by participating in Hong Kong's economic developments. For
pure economic reasons, therefore, China should seek to prevent such
abuses as economic encroachment by Chinese organizations. Moreover,
on the political side, it is well-known that China will use its success with
the one country, two systems approach as an inducement to Taiwan for
eventual reunification.
Taking all of these factors into account, and recognizing both the
difficulties and the necessary degree of speculation, it appears to the author that dealing with Hong Kong in the post-1997 period may be very
much like it is today.

